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Abstract:  Our target article, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience,” has 
provoked a diverse range of commentaries. In this response we have collated what we 
see as the major themes of the discussion. It is clear that we differ from some 
commentators in our commitments to what subjective experience is and what the 
midbrain is capable of. Here we clarify where we stand on those points and how our 
view differs from some other influential perspectives. The commentaries have 
highlighted the most lively areas of disagreement. We revisit here the debates 
surrounding whether the cortex is essential for any form of consciousness in vertebrates, 
how to interpret interventionist evidence, and whether any specific behavioural criteria 
can be used to assess the occurrence of consciousness. We recognise that these debates 
will not be resolved once and for all in this discussion, and we take this opportunity to 
explore what new forms of experimental evidence might be needed to provide clarity. 
We emphasise how functional neurobiological analyses in combination with careful 
behavioural studies of a diverse range of animals will help progress our understanding of 
how neural circuits can support different forms of behaviour. Ultimately this will help us 
reach an understanding of how different conscious capacities could be supported by 
neural systems, and which animals are capable of them. 
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The first round of 19 commentaries on our target article (Klein & Barron, 2016a) cover 
a wide range of issues and opinions. We will group our response into three categories: 
commitments, conflicts and consequences.  
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First, there are differing opinions on what is meant by subjective experience, what is 
needed for it, and how it might be studied. Here we clarify what our commitments are, 
and how we differ from some commentators. We then turn to clear points of conflict, of 
which the most polarizing would be the roles of the cortex and subcortical structures in 
conscious experience. In responding to these points of conflict, we focus on what sorts of 
evidence might be needed to resolve them. Finally, some commentators have considered 
some hypothetical consequences if our argument is in fact correct. We spell out what we 




Several commentators differ from us in their basic commitments. We do not know how 
one might settle some of these disputes, but we think it is worth clarifying what we take 
to be our basic commitments and why.  
 
Subjective experience is the basal form of awareness. Our target article assumes that 
subjective experience is the basal form of awareness. We think that this form of 
subjective experience can and does occur without more complicated forms of self-
reflection and self-experience. As Tye notes, this seems to be the right thing to say even 
about human infants, so it's not a tremendous stretch. Furthermore, we are cautiously 
committed to a claim that Rowlands attributes to us: we think there is some tight 
connection between having subjective experience and having a first-person perspective 
on the world. It is true that “phenomenal feel” is sometimes treated as an intrinsic 
property that could attach to nearly anything, but we have in mind something like 
Nagel's (1974) claim that "... fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if 
and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism — something it is like for 
the organism." Conversely, and for the same reason, we think that the particular features 
of subjective experiences are specific to the organism that has those states, and so we 
are wary of requiring substantial social organization as a necessary condition (unlike 
van Hatteren).  
 
Several commentators worry that the midbrain functions to which we appeal do not 
seem like they are sufficient for subjective experience (Adamo; Allen-Hermanson; 
Cruse & Schilling; Hill; Key, 2016b). Why couldn't bees be, in Allen-Hermanson's 
(2008) nice turn of phrase, “natural zombies,” possessing function without awareness?  
 
Here we think that conflicting intuitions stem from two distinct sources. The first is a 
philosophical concern about the hard problem, and the apparent gap between the 
functional and the phenomenological. We have little to add here beyond the fact that we 
are, in Chalmers's (2003) taxonomy, committed Type-C materialists. We are 
unimpressed by conceivability arguments. We think that scientific advances will show 
where such arguments go wrong, as they have in other scientific domains.  
 
The second source of conflict is, we suspect, an adherence to something like Lloyd 
Morgan's (1894, 1903) Canon. Why posit consciousness when you can get by with mere 
function? Surely, at least, the burden of proof lies, and lies heavily, on folks like us? This 
sort of thing reaches its rhetorical high watermark in Brian Key's (2016a) jeremiad 
elsewhere in this journal, where he analogizes those who posit fish pain to those who 
believe in Russell's celestial teapot.  




Yet Morgan’s Canon has lately fallen on hard times (Andrews & Huss, 2014; Buckner, 
2013; Fitzpatrick, 2008; Mikhalevich, 2015; Sober, 2015). One strand of this debate is 
particularly relevant. Morgan (1903) famously suggested that: 
 
“In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of higher psychological 
processes if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower in 
the scale of psychological evolution and development.” (p. 59)  
 
Using Morgan's Canon thus not only presupposes a clear distinction between “high” and 
“low,” but also that subjective experience falls on the “high” side of the line. We would 
claim that subjective experience is evolutionarily old and phylogenetically widespread. 
Hence appealing to Morgan's Canon simply begs the question.  
 
Of course, lazy anthropomorphism is worth avoiding. The solution to that is evidence, 
not a priori reflection on what capacities might be higher or lower. Indeed, we note that 
Morgan updated his Canon between the 1894 and the 1903 editions to point out that 
postulation of “higher” processes was perfectly acceptable so long as one had 
"independent evidence of the occurrence of these higher processes in the animal under 
observation" (Morgan, 1903; Sober, 2015). We take ourselves to be providing precisely 
that sort of independent evidence. More generally, evidence for animal consciousness 
cannot be dismissed simply by claiming that consciousness is so advanced or complex or 
mysterious that other explanations are to be preferred if available. One might equally 
well run this as a modus tollens: if even insects have subjective experience, then 
subjective experience was not as advanced or complex or mysterious as we once 
thought.  
 
Finally, and on a more conciliatory note, many commentators have pointed out the 
wonderful diversity of other animals that may also be conscious. While we have focused 
on insects, we are quite happy to see the present discussion extend to cephalopods 
(Mather & Carere), decapods (Elwood), and cats (Shanahan). 
 
The capacity of the midbrain. We begin with a few remarks on “capacity.” We claim 
that structural features of the midbrain support the capacity to be conscious at all. 
Attention to the content/capacity distinction also removes another potentially 
misleading formulation. Several commentators took us to be saying that the 
midbrain/diencephalon alone is sufficient for conscious experience (Adamo; Allen-
Hermanson; Cruse & Schilling; Hill; Key, 2016b). This is a complex issue. Strictly 
speaking, our claim is only about the capacity for subjective experience. Whether that 
capacity is actualized in any particular case, and what the resulting contents of 
subjective experience end up being, may depend on many different brain structures. The 
important claim is that since there is no (fundamental) difference between humans and 
insects in the type of functional processing that occurs, there cannot be any difference in 
whether they have the capacity for subjective experience.  
 
An important piece of our evidence for this claim is evidence about the effect of direct 
interventions on the capacity for subjective experience in individual humans (Barron & 
Klein, 2016; Merker, 2007, 2013). That is one reason we have focused on natural and 
experimental interventions in humans. It is also why we have been impressed (as 
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Merker, 2007, and Penfield & Rasmussen, 1959, were before us) with the relative 
insensitivity of the capacity for subjective experience to cortical damage compared to 
the profound effects of subcortical damage. One might take issue with our interpretation 
of those results, of course. We consider those objections in the next section. 
 
We do not claim that it is impossible for cortical damage to eliminate subjective 
experience —just that insofar as it does, it does so because of its effects on subcortical 
structures. While we do (cautiously) endorse Merker's (2007) claim that consciousness 
in humans is possible without a cerebral cortex, this is not a necessary commitment. It 
may be (as Mallat & Feinberg suggest) that in humans the neocortex has become 
important secondarily for generating conscious contents, taking on functions ancestrally 
supported subcortically, hence one cannot have completely contentless awareness 
(Mallatt & Feinberg). Here there is much room for debate, as there is for debate over 
which parts of the midbrain are most important.  
 
We also make a specific set of claims about the functional processing of the midbrain 
that make it the basis for the capacity for subjective experience. It is widely assumed, 
including by many of our commentators (Chalmers, 1996; Edelman, Moyal, & Fekete; 
Fekete & Edelman, 2011), that the proper way to describe the capacity for subjective 
experience will be in functional or computational terms, rather than in basic neural or 
molecular terms. Chief among these functional capacities is the ability to integrate 
information about the sensory, homeostatic and motor processing of the organism into a 
single unified model (Merker, 2007, 2013).  
 
We do continue to insist, however, that whatever function is appealed to ought to be tied 
relatively closely to specific biologically based problems and their solution in 
evolutionary history. The fundamental features we have appealed to are ones that arise 
when biological organisms begin moving around their environment under their own 
control (Merker, 2005, 2007). We note that other authors who are in broad agreement 
have emphasized a different set of functions: Eva Jablonska and colleagues emphasize 
the role of unlimited associative learning (Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2015). Morsella & 
Walker's Passive Frame theory (Morsella, Godwin, Jantz, Krieger, & Gazzaley, 2015) 
similarly focuses on action selection in the sense of constraining output to skeletal 
muscle; with suitable adaptation this might be an interesting parallel. Similarly, although 
we assumed that Global Workspace Theory would require unreasonably sophisticated 
functioning, Shanahan's discussion suggests some interesting points of convergence. 
We welcome these discussions, and do not take them to be conflicts per se but rather the 




This set of commentaries has highlighted the most vigorous areas of disagreement 
around our target article. Clearly we won't resolve disagreements once and for all here. 
A better question might be:  what new evidence would we need to resolve them?  
 
Neuroanatomy: Are subcortical structures sufficient to support a capacity for 
subjective experience, or is the cortex essential? This is perhaps the most critical 
point of disagreement. We follow Merker (2005) in that we believe the processing 
within the structures of the midbrain, basal ganglia and diencephalon are sufficient for 
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the basic capacity of subjective experience, given our commitments above. Some 
commentators broadly agree with us (Mallat & Feinberg; Merker). We particularly 
acknowledge the contributions of Mallat & Feinberg who published in parallel to our 
original paper an excellent book detailing a careful functional neuroanatomical and 
phylogenetic analysis of the vertebrates (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016). They have 
independently reached conclusions broadly similar to ours.  
 
Others strongly disagree with us on this issue (Allen-Hermanson; Key, 2016b), and it 
seems clear that the debate cannot be settled using just the evidence currently available 
to us. What then would we need to give clarity? Here we agree with Key (2016b) that to 
make progress we need far more detailed functional and computational analyses of the 
brains of diverse animals. These data are coming, as connectomic initiatives and 
computational modelling of neural systems advance. Our argument relies heavily on 
functional analogies drawn across animal lineages. These analogies will be more 
accurate once we have more information on the forms of computation that can be 
supported by the brains of different animals. To understand the roles of the cortex and 
subcortical structures, we need more of this kind of data from within the vertebrate 
lineage as well as across other phyla.  
 
(Key, 2016b) argues  “that a phenomenally conscious nervous system must have 
observer neural networks that are able to introspect and create meta-representations of 
its sensory neural processing.” We are not so sure about this. An “observer neural 
network” runs close to repackaging the philosophically difficult Cartesian theatre, or the 
unhelpful concept of the “brain within the brain,” which we are not fond of. The concept 
of “meta-representations” is also not a particularly clean one. If meta-representations 
are simply higher order statistical summaries of sensory data, or recurrent neural 
networks, then insects have these. Intrinsic neurons of the insect antennal and visual 
lobes generate statistical summaries of sensory information to improve recognition and 
classification of salient stimuli (Galizia, 2014; Horridge, 2005). Recurrent neural 
networks and neuromodulatory elements feed back from integrative centers of the 
insect brain to the sensory lobes to facilitate learning of likes and dislikes (“affect” in the 
sense of Feinberg and Mallatt, 2016), and support the emotion-like behavioural changes 
recently reported for honey bees (Perry, Baciadonna, & Chittka, 2016). We are not sure 
that Key would consider these kinds of meta-representations as adding to the evidence 
that the insect brain can support subjective experience, however. Even so, exploring the 
relationships between meta-representations in nervous systems and subjective 
experience will certainly help to bring clarity to this debate, and this is where the 
perspective of computational modelling is especially needed. 
 
The role of the vertebrate cortex — interpretation of interventionist evidence. Our 
interpretation of anaesthesia and vegetative state studies is challenged by Allen-
Hermanson, who notes that although we cite both Schiff (2010) and Långsjö et al. 
(2012), these both make reference to a cortical contribution. Allen-Hermanson notes 
that Långsjö et al. claim that "minimal cortical activity is necessary” for conscious 
experience. It would have been worth quoting the relevant Långsjö et al. passage in full, 
however:  
 
“As shown in our results, only minimal cortical activity is necessary at this point. 
Thus, emergence of a conscious state, the essential foundation of consciousness (Fig. 
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1), precedes the full recovery of neocortical processing required for rich conscious 
experiences.” (p. 4940) 
 
One would have thought the qualifiers were rather important, and indeed a look at 
Långsjö et al.’s (2012) Figure 1 confirms that there is very little activation at all outside 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The ACC is also the only cortical area cited by Schiff 
(2010), and then only because "it receives strong inputs for the anterior intralaminar 
nuclei" and "very diffuse regulatory input across large territories of the rostral striatum" 
— in short, because of its causal relationship to midbrain structures. Unilateral lesions 
to ACC aren't traditionally associated with loss of consciousness but with disorders of 
affective regulation (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). Bilateral lesions can produce akinetic 
mutism, but there is substantial evidence that akinetic mute patients are still conscious 
(Klein, Forthcoming).  
 
Several commentators (Allen-Hermanson; Paul & Mendl) mentioned blindsight as a 
possible counterexample. Here we think there is some confusion about our position. We 
have consistently emphasized that the cortex has an important role in shaping the 
contents of human experience. It is no surprise that damage to visual cortex removes 
whole categories of visual experience. The interpretation of blindsight cases is 
complicated by ongoing debates over whether there is a real distinction between Type 1 
and Type 2 blindsight (Overgaard, Fehl, Mouridsen, Bergholt, & Cleeremans, 2008; 
Overgaard & Mogensen, 2015). As McPherson (2015) notes, it is also unclear what 
would count as distinctively visual phenomenology: if motion and form (for example) 
can be perceived in the absence of color and edge perception, then Type 2 blindsight 
might be more interpretable. We remain neutral about whether, in humans, subcortical 
structures alone are sufficient for any particular visual experience (rather than the 
capacity to have visual experience at all).  
 
Finally, we note again that the question of how to interpret the evidence from cortical 
lesion studies (Allen-Hermanson) is separate from whether animals lacking a cortex 
might be capable of subjective experience. An animal with a cortical lesion or 
intervention is not the same as an animal that never had a cortex. We highlight Mallat & 
Feinberg's intriguing hypothesis that the cortex might look special in higher mammals 
because, once it evolved, key functions supporting consciousness became far more 
dependent upon the cortex than on subcortical structures. This is worth exploring; 
functional analyses of the brains of a good phylogenetic spread of vertebrates would be a 
way forward.  
 
Behaviour: Are there key behavioural criteria for subjective experience? There is 
clearly a lot of disagreement over what behavioural capacities, if any, demonstrate 
subjective experience. Van Hatteren argues that dynamic social bonding is needed 
because it requires animals to engage in communication that involves transforming their 
state of agency and goals into communicative signals. Van Hateren proposes this 
transformation must be so complex it must presuppose subjective experience. We agree 
that complex communication of one's state of self could be indicative of forms of 
consciousness. There are good reasons humans care a lot about other humans' 
declarative reports of their sense and state of self. But as we have emphasized, we do not 
feel this sort of behavioural evidence is necessary for the existence of subjective 
experience.  




Tye proposes that evidence of meta-cognition would show an animal is conscious of the 
things it is meta-cognizing about, but he also imagines that an animal could be capable of 
basic subjective awareness without being able to demonstrate meta-cognitive abilities. 
We are cautious about meta-cognition as evidence for any particular level of 
consciousness. We have been able to show that honey bees’ behaviour in a choice task is 
influenced by their internal state of uncertainty about the correct choice (Perry & 
Barron, 2013). Bees were trained in a visual discrimination task in which they received 
reward for a correct choice, quinine for an incorrect choice, or could simply exit the trial 
(opt-out). Opting out improved bees’ performance overall – especially when the 
discrimination task was difficult (Perry & Barron, 2013). This is interpreted as indicating 
that use of the opt-out was biased toward trials they were most likely to fail at. In 
vertebrate studies this has been interpreted as behavioural evidence of animals 
adjusting their choice behaviour according to their certainty of success (Crystal & Foote, 
2009; Smith, Beran, Couchman, Coutinho, & Boomer, 2009); this meets some operational 
definitions of metacognitive behaviour (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Nelson, 1996). 
However, this kind of response could be achieved without a bee’s having a neural 
representation of its state of uncertainty. This kind of behavioural response could occur 
if opting out is a default response when the two choices cannot be effectively 
distinguished and are equally attractive (Perry & Barron, 2013).  
 
We don’t think any behavioural criteria on their own will ever differentiate animals that 
have subjective experience from those that don’t. What are needed are careful 
behavioural analyses of what animals can do in combination with neurobiological 
analyses of how they do it. Neurobiological analyses of the scope and mechanisms of the 
animal brain’s capacity to represent, unify, weight, value and select sensory information 
will allow us to make evidence-based statements about the capacity of the animal mind. 
Progress is already being made here. We particularly highlight the work of van 
Swinderen’s lab (Paulk et al., 2014; van Swinderen, 2005; van Swinderen & Greenspan, 




Do insects feel pain? Several commentators focused on the question of whether insects 
feel pain (Elwood; Paul & Mendl). Though pain was not part of our original argument, 
we do want to clarify where we stand.  
 
The term “pain” is multiply ambiguous (Hare, 1964). In the most basic sense (what we 
sometimes refer to as “physical pain”), it is a sensation associated with protection of 
bodily integrity in the face of injury. It is thus one of many sensations associated with 
behaviourally mediated homeostasis (Klein, 2015), along with sensations like hunger, 
thirst, dyspnea, core warmth and coldness, the felt need to urinate and defecate, the 
hunger for specific nutrients (like sodium) and so on (Craig, 2002; Denton, 2006; Klein, 
2015). All of these sensations are basic to survival, and it should not surprise us if they 
turn out to be widespread.  
 
We think it is obvious that insects feel pain in this sense. Indeed, we are a bit mystified at 
the vehemence with which it is denied here and elsewhere given the link between pain 
and other homeostatic sensations. One might deny that fish are conscious at all — but 
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surely if they are conscious, there is no serious debate about whether they get hungry. 
We suggest that a similar response is appropriate for pain. Adamo wonders what a 
robot might gain from feeling pain. Yet there is a perfectly straightforward story about 
why pain (as opposed to mere withdrawal reflexes) is adaptive. As Elwood notes for 
decapods, “Finely tuned decisions that weigh and trade off different motivations can be 
observed in decapods in response to noxious stimuli.” In general, homeostatic demands 
are one part of the Merker (2007) triangle, broadly relevant to all actions.  
 
Ethical consequences. Several commentators noted that our position might have 
profound ethical implications (Fischer; Lamey). As Fischer notes, sentience is often the 
criterion that separates things which don't deserve moral consideration from the things 
which might. Yet if insects do deserve serious moral consideration, we're in a bit of a 
bind. We kill unimaginable numbers of insects in the course of modern life, mostly 
without even trying. While our work was not motivated by ethical considerations, we 
are willing to follow the consequences where they lead.  
 
The common and sensible position seems to be that if insects are conscious, then they 
have moral standing — in Fischer's terms, we have obligations to insects, not merely 
regarding insects — but that how much we owe to insects depends on what they are 
conscious of. This may seem like a trivial point, but it is worth emphasizing. If insects 
feel pain, that probably gives us more reason to care about their interests than if they 
just feel slightly sleepy all the time. Similarly, if there is a difference between feeling pain 
and suffering, then organisms that feel both arguably deserve more concern.  
 
Clarifying what different organisms feel might then result in a gradated scale of moral 
duty, with insects somewhere near the bottom. Fischer suggests that the distinction 
between basic and sophisticated interests might provide a means for ranking. Lamey 
recommends traditional criteria such as psychological unity or the ability to suffer. It is 
also possible (though neither author emphasizes the distinction) that these criteria 
could be used in different ways. Insect and human standing might be comparable, in the 
sense that we could ask how many fleas could be killed to make a dog's life better 
(Lamey). Or, we might simply think that insects belong to a lower and incommensurate 
“tier” of moral interest, so that we should always prefer them to plants and prefer 
mammals to them (whatever the numbers on each side).  
 
We are not ethicists; we leave these debates to those better suited. The important thing 
to emphasize is that ethical standing, on any of these accounts, depends on the contents 
of subjective experience. The scientific work of sorting out those contents thus remains 
paramount. That said, we think one point in particular is worth emphasizing. Most 
discussions have focused on what we might owe to individual invertebrates. This is a 
natural extension of human ethics, but perhaps misleading. Sentience aside, many of our 
moral concerns are shaped by the fact that we live long lives, and that we put relatively 
large amounts of resources into our children and others around us, expecting them to 
also live long lives. None of this translates well to invertebrates. Instead, we might think 
of invertebrates as something we owe duties to in aggregate. (Note that this should be 
distinguished sharply from a view that says that insect collectives like hives have moral 
standing as individuals, a position we find implausible.) That is, we may have a duty to 
honey bees to make sure that they don't go extinct from our pesticide usage, even if it is 
hard to drum up much sympathy for any particular bee.  




Evolution — why did subjective experience evolve, and how often? If it is possible 
to determine which animals have subjective experience and which do not, then we will 
be positioned to subject the trait to a phylogenetic analysis. This will show how often 
subjective experience has evolved, and whether (and if so how often) it has been lost. 
From this we will be able to infer the evolutionary circumstances that promote the 
evolution of subjective experience. Søvik & Perry present a first shot at a synthesis.  
 
We have argued above that assessing whether a species has subjective experience 
demands integrated behavioural, functional neurobiological and neurocomputational 
analyses. To draw sound phylogenetic conclusions, we will need data from a broad range 
of species across clades as well as sufficiently deep sampling within clades to capture 
diversity. Where should we start? We agree with Elwood that the crustaceans (as a 
sister group to insects) would be a very informative group for testing and extending our 
hypotheses about subjective experience in arthropods. Mollusca deserve special 
mention. The cognitive capacities of cephalopods are much vaunted (Mather & Carere). 
But the cephalopods also sit within perhaps the most interesting comparative group. 
Within the extant representatives of Mollusca there is more variation in nervous system 
organisation, body plan and life history strategy than any other phylum. This would be 





While the extent to which non-human animals are conscious is hardly a new debate, we 
are probably the first to propose a neurobiological argument for why insects might have 
the capacity for a basic form of consciousness. That proposition, and these responses to 
it, demonstrate the rapid evolution of current thinking both about what is needed to 
support a capacity for consciousness and about what the insect brain is capable of.  
 
As an indicator of how much things have changed: in 1984 Eisemann et al. characterised 
insect behaviour in the following way: 
 
"By contrast, most insect behavior patterns are to a large extent pre-programmed 
leaving much less scope for individual learning of appropriate behavior from 
noxious and 'pleasant' stimuli, although there is a capacity for learning (including 
avoidance) in both intact and decapitated insects and in isolated ganglia." (p. 165) 
 
That view now seems very outdated. In our papers this year we have presented a model 
of the kinds of integrated processing we believe the insect brain is capable of, and an 
argument why we believe this processing is sufficient to support subjective experience 
(Barron & Klein, 2016; Klein & Barron, 2016a). We argue that both of these aspects of 
the thesis should be testable and refutable. Certainly functional neurobiological analyses 
of the insect brain are progressing at an enormous speed thanks to advances in 
connectomics (Chiang et al., 2011), neurogenetic technologies (Seelig & Jayaraman, 
2015) and methods of neural modeling, among other things. Our expectation is that as 
we learn more about how neural circuits do things and support different forms of 
behaviour, we will be better placed to describe what kinds of neural systems will be 
needed to support different forms of consciousness. We have previously proposed that 
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Chalmers’s “hard problem" of consciousness is hard “not because it has no answer, but 
because we do not yet know what a satisfying answer could look like” (Klein & Barron, 
2016b). We argue that functional analyses of diverse animal brains can help us frame an 
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